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Abstract. Model-Driven Security (Mds) has emerged as a promising
sound methodology for modern secure systems development. Following
the advances in Mds, our work described in this paper has proposed
a solution to better support secure systems development, and further
strengthens Mds. Our Mds solution focuses on modularity and reusabil-
ity in secure systems development. On one hand, we have proposed a
modular approach for modularity and dynamic adaptation of flexibly se-
cure systems. On the other hand, we have been working on Mds based
on a library-like System of generic Security design Patterns (shortly
called SoSPa) in which security design patterns are collected, specified
as reusable aspect models to form a coherent system of them that guides
developers in systematically selecting the right security design patterns
for the job. Either way, security (design pattern) models can be auto-
matically woven into the target system model. The woven secure system
model can then be used for (partial) code generation, including (con-
figured) security infrastructures. We have also worked on model-based
security testing to validate the resulting secure systems.
Keywords: Model-Driven Security, Model-Driven Engineering, Secu-
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1 Problem and Motivation
Model-Driven Engineering (Mde) has been considered by some researcher [2]
as a solution to the handling of complex and evolving software systems. As a
specialization of Mde, Model-Driven Security (Mds) aims at providing means
to tackle the complexity, and increase the productivity in modern secure sys-
tems development. However, there are still weaknesses in the state of the art
of Mds. Our recent systematic review of Mds [5] shows that more Mds work
is needed to deal with multiple security concerns at the same time. Moreover,
not many Mds approaches have fully leveraged the Aspect-Oriented Modelling
(Aom) techniques for specifying multiple security concerns, and for enhancing
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the modularity of secure systems. Mds also lacks a complete tool chain (based on
model transformations) to automate the derivation from Mds models to code.
Besides, security patterns which are based on domain-independent, time-proven
security knowledge and expertise, can be considered as reusable security bricks
upon which sound and secure systems can be built. But security patterns are not
applied as much as they could be because developers have problems in selecting
them and applying them in the right places, especially at the design phase. Fol-
lowing the advances in Mds, this paper describes the late-PhD work that has
proposed a solution to better support secure systems development, and further
strengthens Mds. Our Mds solution focuses on modularity and reusability in se-
cure systems development. On one hand, we have proposed a modular approach
for modularity and dynamic adaptation of flexibly secure systems. On the other
hand, we have been working on Mds based on a library-like System of generic
aspect-oriented Security design Patterns (SoSPa) in which security design pat-
terns are collected, specified as reusable aspect models to form a coherent system
of them that guides developers in systematically selecting the right security de-
sign patterns for the right job. Either way, security (design pattern) models can
be automatically woven into the target system model. The woven secure system
model can then be used for (partial) code generation, including (configured) se-
curity infrastructures. We have also worked on model-based security testing to
validate the resulting secure systems. Our research work aims towards an inte-
grated Mds framework (and tool chain) which 1) allows a target system model
to embed various security solutions, 2) enables the generation of (partial) im-
plementation code including (configured) security infrastructures, and 3) makes
these security properties testable by construction.
2 Related Work and Our Systematic Review of MDS
There have been a significant number of Mds approaches proposed so far. Re-
cently, we have conducted a systematic review of Mds and then published a
paper reporting the results of our review [5]. One of the main results is that
we have found out five primary MDS approaches according to our selection cri-
teria. These approaches are listed as follows: SecureUML, UMLsec, SECTET,
SecureMDD, and Secure data warehouses. More details about these Mds ap-
proaches can be found in [5], and in our book chapter, namely Advances in MDS
[4]. Moreover, we are working on extending [5] for submission to a journal.
The results in [5] show not only a clear picture of current main approaches in
Mds but also the current status of key aspects in Mds. The results suggest that
more attention should be paid for dealing with multiple security concerns at the
same time. Most current approaches only deal with solely one security concern,
especially authorization. Besides, there are significantly less Mds papers tackling
integrity, availability, and authentication than authorization and confidentiality.
An important remark is that more work should be done to have Domain Spe-
cific Languages (Dsls) or models with well-defined semantics of various security
concerns. These models must be extensively, formally defined in order to enable
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Fig. 1. Overview of our Model-Driven Adaptive Delegation approach as shown in [7]
the integration with automated analysis tools (based on well-established for-
mal methods) and/or program synthesis tools. On the other hand, a tool chain
(based on model transformations) to derive from models (to models, and then)
to implementation code is also an important piece of future work. Regarding
modeling approaches, there are very few selected papers propose a full Aom ap-
proach that security concerns are specified as aspects and eventually woven into
the primary model(s). Last but not least, there is a lack of empirical studies for
Mds approaches so more empirical studies of Mds should be conducted.
3 MDS with Modularity and Dynamic Adaptation
As the first approach, we focused on dealing with the authorization problem,
especially role-based access control (RBAC) and delegation. In [7], it has been
shown that various RBAC-based delegation features can be specified using our
metamodel (Dsl). OurDsl supports complex delegation characteristics like tem-
porary, recurrence delegation, transfer delegation, multiple and multi-step dele-
gation, etc. On the other hand, the business logic (base system) can be specified
using another Dsl, e.g. an architecture (component-based) metamodel [7].
In the modeling phase, security concerns are modeled independently with
business logic. Then, security models have to be composed with the target system
model to obtain a new model of the system augmented of security properties. Fig.
1 presents an overview of our extensive model-driven approach for access control
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and delegation management [7], [8]. In our approach, delegation is considered
as a “meta-level” mechanism which impacts the existing access control policies,
like an aspect can impact a base program. We claim that to handle advanced
delegation rules, an ideal solution is to separate the delegation rules from the
access control policy, each being specified in isolation, and then compose/weave
them together to obtain a new access control policy (called active security policy)
reflecting the both access control and delegation.
As can be seen in Fig. 1, a complete model-driven framework has been pro-
posed to enable dynamic enforcement of delegation and access control policies
that allows the automatic configuration of the system according to the changes
in delegation/access control rules. The enforcement of security policy to the tar-
get system is in fact the composition of security models with the target system
model. The dynamic adaptation of the running system is possible thanks to
the modern adaptive execution platforms like OSGi1, Kevoree2, which provide
low-level APIs to reconfigure a system at runtime.
4 MDS with Modularity and Reusability
In the previous section, we has shown our MDS approach for modularity and
dynamic adaptation of secure systems. In that approach, access control and del-
egation policies are modeled by using a tailored Dsl which is limited for only
authorization (access control and delegation). In this section, we present an ex-
ploratory MDS approach that can be used for developing secure systems dealing
with multiple security concerns (e.g., authentication, authorization, encryption,
etc.) at the same time. To be more specific, our approach is based on a system of
reusable aspect-oriented security design patterns which is generic and extensible
to address all security concerns with the interrelations among them.
Security patterns which are based on domain-independent, time-proven secu-
rity knowledge and expertise, can be considered as reusable security bricks upon
which sound and secure systems can be built. A security pattern solely can not
help to secure a system against different threats. Thus, it is necessary to build a
system of security patterns in which inter-pattern relations are specified [10]. To
the best of our knowledge, none of existing Mds approaches has proposed a Sys-
tem of generic aspect-oriented Security design Patterns which provides not only
well-defined security design patterns but also the support meta-information that
can guide developers in systematically selecting the right security design pat-
terns for the right job. We have proposed an exploratory Mds approach based
on a System of generic aspect-oriented Security design Patterns (shortly called
SoSPa3) [6] in which security design patterns are collected, specified as reusable
aspect models (Ram) [3] to form a coherent system of them. Our approach is
inspired by [1] in which the authors propose an approach based on Ram for
designing software with concern as the main unit of reuse. Here, we specifically
1 www.osgi.org
2 www.kevoree.org
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target security with a system of aspect-oriented security design patterns which
can be specified using Ram. Roughly speaking, a developer could use SoSPa as
an extensible library like a programmer would reuse generic classes in Java/.Net
programming libraries. More than that, SoSPa and ourMds framework based on
it provide means for a developer to systematically select the right security design
patterns for the right job. Technically, the system of security design patterns con-
sists of an extensible set of security concerns (e.g. authentication, authorization,
encryption, etc.) which can fulfill the security objectives (e.g., confidentiality,
integrity, availability, privacy). Each security concern is composed of a set of
aspect-oriented security design patterns that realizes the security concern. The
meta-info about interrelationships/relations among security design patterns are
well specified within the system of them, i.e. by using an extended feature model.
For example, some security design patterns could complement one another, or
exclude each other. Moreover, each security design pattern also contains other
meta-info describing the side effects of its adoption on other non-functional qual-
ity criterion, e.g. performance, usability, etc. All these meta-info are useful for
analysis of the trade-off among alternatives which leads to a thoughtful deci-
sion on systematically selecting the right security design patterns for the job.
As we target a full Mds approach, the SoSPa is proposed to be built on a
meta-model which is part a full Model-Driven Software Development framework
[6]. Our framework allows the selected security design patterns to be automati-
cally composed with the target system model. The woven secure system model
can then be used for (partial) code generation, including (configured) security
infrastructures.
5 Model-Based Security Testing
We focus on proposing a Model-Based Security Testing and Mutation Analysis
approach for the validation of the resulting secure system. From the security
model(s), we plan to automate the generation of security test cases. Our goal of
using mutation analysis is to derive a sufficient test set, which can detect all the
security faults denoted by the mutants. In that way the correct secure system
that can pass the sufficient test set will be obtained. We have adopted mutation
analysis for delegation policies [9]. Mutation analysis operates by introducing
artificial defects called mutants into the artifacts of the program under investi-
gation. Our approach in [9] consists of analyzing the representation of the key
components of delegation, based on which we derive the suggested set of mutant
operators. These operators can then be used to introduce mutants into delega-
tion policies and thus, enable mutation testing. There is still more work to be
done to validate our idea in [9].
Here we propose to use security testing because so far formal verification
methods for security still have limitations. Only some specific problem areas such
as smart-cards or cryptographic protocols are applicable for formal verification
methods. Formal verification is still unfeasible for larger systems due to increased
complexity and dependencies.
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6 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we have presented a late-PhD work on Mds with modularity
and reusability for secure systems development. The first main contribution of
this work is a systematic literature review of Mds [5], and a book chapter on
advances in Mds [4]. This literature review module is more or less done even
though we are still working on a journal version of the review paper. Secondly,
we have proposed a modular approach for modularity and dynamic adaptation
of secure systems, i.e. model-driven adaptive delegation [7], [8]. But there is still
more work to be done for dealing with multiple security concerns. Towards the
third main contribution, we have been working on a Mds approach based on a
library-like System of generic aspect-oriented Security design Patterns in which
security design patterns are collected, specified as reusable aspect models to form
a coherent system of them that guides developers in systematically selecting the
right security design patterns for the right job [6]. And last but not least, the fi-
nal main contribution is about model-based security testing. Our work on testing
delegation policy enforcement via mutation analysis [9] is at the beginning. We
will continue working on that. For validating the approach presented in [7] and
[8], we have used three different case studies (LMS, VMS, and AMSM). For the
exploratory approach in [6], we plan to validate our ideas using the case study
CCCMS described in [3], and target three main security concerns, i.e. authen-
tication, authorization, and cryptography, with interrelationships among them.
In the end, we also would like to have an industrial case study for evaluating our
exploratory approach presented in [6].
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